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Foreword
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has prepared this publication 
on the occasion of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to ECLAC headquarters, in order to provide current 
information on trade and investment in Latin America and the Caribbean and the People’s Republic 
of China, as well as contribute to the discussion on the current signicance and future implications of 
closer ties with China and the Asia-Pacic region for regional development.
In recent decades, China —along with Asia’s other emerging economies— has become a key 
factor in understanding globalization trends and perspectives. Owing to its outstanding performance 
in economic growth, international trade, foreign direct investment and technological innovation, as 
well as its role as a source of international nancing, China is rapidly redrawing the global economic 
map. It is strengthening ties between developing economies and driving an unprecedented cycle of 
growth, trade, investment, poverty reduction and global integration among emerging economies. As 
a result, the income gap between those economies and their industrialized counterparts is shrinking.
Several decades of annual growth of around 10% in China have reshaped Asian value chains, 
which are increasingly based in China, the heavyweight country in the “Asia factory.” China’s swift 
economic growth is forging stronger links between the Asian economies and driving intra-industry 
growth and reciprocal investment. Accordingly, an effective strategy to build closer ties with China 
cannot overlook the strong relationship that exists between East and Southeast Asia.
China’s robust growth is reected in strong demand for commodities and natural resources, which 
often come from countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Regional trade with China has been 
soaring for a decade, and in just a few years the country has become a key trading partner for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, spurring growth in the region’s commodity exporting countries.
Accordingly, the time is right to seize this historic opportunity to tackle infrastructure, innovation 
and human resource decits and transform natural resource wealth into various forms of human, 
physical and institutional capital, raising productivity and competitiveness and diversifying the export 
base. A very important parallel challenge will be to increase the volume of Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in the region, especially to improve infrastructure, promote export diversication and 
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encourage business partnerships between Latin America and China. To that end, the region must pursue a 
broader strategic relationship with China and East-Southeast Asia that transcends the country-level efforts 
that have prevailed thus far.
The recent consensus opinion on China’s economic slowdown is that the country’s economic policy is 
nely calibrated, enabling it to slow ination and eliminate real estate bubbles, while creating headroom 
so stimulus programs can be deployed to sustain growth in the event that weak economic conditions in 
the industrialized countries persist.
This publication examines recent broad trends in trade between China and Latin America and the 
Caribbean, as well as in Chinese FDI in the region. It points out that trade is essentially inter-industry, with 
China exporting manufactured goods and Latin America and the Caribbean mainly exporting commodities. 
This weakens the potential for business partnerships between China and Latin America and makes it hard 
for countries in the latter region to more fully participate in value chains in Asia and the Pacic. It should 
be noted that Chinese authorities have indicated their willingness to discuss this major challenge and 
identify mutually benecial agreements.
For several years, ECLAC has been involved in activities at various levels to strengthen economic 
relations between Latin America and the Caribbean and the Asia-Pacic region, especially China. It has 
participated in the ve China-Latin America Business Summits, the rst China-Latin America think-tank 
forum, organized in Beijing, the meetings of the Forum of Ministers of the Latin American Pacic Basin 
Initiative and the Pacic Alliance, and other forums. Moreover, in late May 2012, together with the Latin 
American Development Bank (CAF) and the Association for Latin American Integration (ALADI), it 
inaugurated the Latin America-Asia-Pacic Relations Observatory. Thus, this publication is part of ongoing 
efforts to encourage ties between Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia and the Pacic, the most 
dynamic region in the world.1
1 The following publications, among others, are particularly relevant: “The Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative and the 
Asia-Pacific region” (LC/L.2950), September 2008; “Economic and Trade Relations between Latin America and Asia-Pacific. 
The Link with China” (LC/L.2959), October 2008; “Opportunities for Trade and Investment between Latin America and 
Asia-Pacific. The Link with APEC” (LC/L.2971), November 2008;  “The Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative after the 
Crisis. Challenges and Proposals” (LC/R.2156), November 2009; and “The People’s Republic of China and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Towards a Strategic Relationship” (LC/L.3224), June 2011. See [online] http://www.cepal.org/comercio/.
5The People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Dialogue and cooperation for the new challenges of the global economy
1. The world’s developing countries, led by China, now contribute over half  
of global economic growth 
 Figure 1 
Selected regions: contribution to global GDP growth, 2000-2016 a
(Percentages)
Developed countriesAsia’s developing countries














































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database, April 2011.
a The 2011-2016 data are projections.
 Figure 2 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database, April 2012.
 ■ The industrialized countries’ share of global growth fell 
from over half in 2000 to little more than one quarter in 2007. 
Following a partial recovery in 2010, the United States and 
especially Japan and the European Union are now looking 
at several years of sluggish growth. The forecast for 2016 
is that the industrialized countries will be responsible for 
just one quarter of global economic growth. In other words, 
their contribution will have fallen by one half in 15 years.
 ■ Meanwhile, the developing countries are now responsible 
for over half of global economic growth. Asia’s developing 
countries, led by China, stand out in particular and are 
forecast to contribute around 55% of global growth by 2016.
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By the end of the decade, trade between developing countries (South-South) is 
expected to surpass trade between developed countries (North-North)
 Figure 3 
Developed countries (North) and developing countries (South): 



















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
 Figure 4 
Developed countries (North) and developing countries (South): 




















































North-North North-South South-South South-North
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
a The figures for and after 2011 are ECLAC projections.
2. 
 ■ International trade flows have been transformed in recent 
decades as the world’s developed countries have outpaced 
their industrialized counterparts in economic growth. 
Since the mid-1980s, developing countries have seen their 
share of global exports rise sharply. In fact, developing 
countries now export more to each other than they do to 
developed countries. The strong growth of Asian trade, 
both within the region as well as with other developing 
regions, has been a key factor in this reconfiguration.
 ■ The correlate to the above has been a sharp decline in the 
developed countries’ share of global trade, from over 60% 
in 1985 to under 40% in 2010.
 ■ If the growth rates seen in the different categories of 
trade flows over the past decade are extrapolated forward 
several years, trade between developing countries can 
be expected to surpass the volume traded by developed 
countries by around 2017.
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3. In 2010, for the first time ever, the developing countries, along with countries  
in transition, received half of global flows of foreign direct investment
 Figure 5 
Global inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and share of the 
economies in transition, 1990-2011 a
























































Share of developing economies and economies in transition (right axis)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), using the UNCTADSTAT 
database.
a The 2011 figures are preliminary estimates.
 ■  In 2010 and 2011, the developing countries and economies 
in transition received 51% and 50% of global FDI flows, 
respectively. The two developing regions that attract the 
largest FDI flows are Asia and Oceania, led by China and 
Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), 
and Latin America and the Caribbean, where Brazil is 
the main recipient.
 ■ The developing countries and economies in transition have 
also taken on a much more central role as foreign investors. 
Whereas in 2000 they originated 11% of global FDI ows, 
their share in 2011 was 26%, the second highest level ever, 
after 2010 (31%).
 Figure 6 



























A. By recipient group B. By originating group
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Global Investment Trends 
Monitor, No 8, January 2012 and No 9, April 2012.
a Latin America and the Caribbean includes the financial centres of the Caribbean.
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4. 5. Firms in emerging countries are rising in the rankings of the world’s  
largest companies
 Figure 7  





























A. 2006 B. 2012
Source: Forbes magazine, [online] http://www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#p_1_s_a0_All%20industries_All%20countries_All%20states_y http://www.forbes.com/lists/2006/18/06f2000_The-
Forbes-2000_ Rank.html
a China includes companies based in Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China).
 ■ The U.S. magazine Forbes publishes an annual list known 
as the Global 2000, a ranking of the 2,000 largest publicly 
traded companies in the world, chosen based on four 
indicators: sales, prots, assets, and market value. Of 
the 200 companies at the top of this list, rms from emerging 
countries strongly improved their presence between 2006 
and 2012. In 2006, only 14 of the 200 largest companies (7%) 
were headquartered in emerging countries, a gure that 
grew to 40 (20%) in 2012. Along these same lines, only one 
rm from an emerging country ranked among the world’s 
top 50 companies in 2006 (Samsung, Republic of Korea, 
in position 49), compared with 12 in 2012, three of which 
numbered among the top 10 companies on the list: Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), PetroChina, and 
Brazil’s Petrobras.
 ■ Most companies from emerging countries that appear on 
the list are in the energy and banking industries, although 
some are also in mining, telecommunications, automotive, 
electronics and other industries. As for home country, most 
are based in the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China). Chinese companies make a particularly strong 
showing, accounting for 8% of the top 200 companies in 2012. 
9The People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Dialogue and cooperation for the new challenges of the global economy
5. Emerging and developing economies hold two thirds of official international 
reserves; China alone has 30%
 ■ Over the past decade, emerging economies have nearly 
doubled their share of the world’s holdings of ofcial 
international reserves. China, in particular, stands out for 
having increased its share nearly four-fold in one decade. 
In 2011, it held 30% of the global stock of ofcial international 
reserves, or roughly half of the share of all emerging and 
developing economies. This performance was facilitated by 
the large trade and current account surpluses that it posted 
throughout the period.
 ■ Other developing and emerging countries, such as in the 
Middle East and North Africa, also increased their share 
of global reserve holdings, thanks to the trade surpluses 
generated by their oil exports.
 ■ The increase in reserves held by the developing countries 
makes them less vulnerable than in the past to exchange-
rate or balance-of-payment crises.
 Figure 8 
Participation by China and the emerging and developing 
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China Emerging and developing economies
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
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6. 7. Emerging economies, led by China, hold a majority of assets managed  
by sovereign wealth funds
 Figure 9 
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Financed from other sources
Financed from commodity exports
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute and CityUK estimates.
a The 2012 figures are projections.
 Table 1 
Countries and regions of origin of sovereign wealth funds, 2011
(Billions of dollars and percentages)
Country                                 Amount Percentage Region Amount Percentage
China 1 411 29 Asia 1 927 40
United Arab 
Emirates 783 16
Middle East 1 682 35
Norway 560 12 Europe 802 17
Saudi Arabia 478 10 America 138 3
Singapore 405 8 Africa 130 3
Kuwait 296 6 Other 120 2
Russian 
Federation 114 2 Total 4 800 100
Other 753 16
Total 4 800 100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on the 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute and CityUK estimates. 
 ■ Between 2002 and late 2011, the value of assets managed by 
sovereign wealth funds (SWF) grew from US$ 1 billion to 
nearly US$ 5 billion, while the number of SWFs increased 
more than in the previous four decades. Most of this growth 
took place in the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East 
and North Africa and in the countries with trade surpluses 
in Asia. These two subregions accounted for 55% of all SWFs 
and three quarters of the assets managed by such funds. 
SWFs nanced by commodity exports, mainly oil, held 56% 
of all SWF managed assets at end-2011. The other SWFs 
were primarily nanced from foreign currency reserves, 
scal account surpluses, government pension reserves and 
revenue from the privatization of State-owned enterprises.
 ■ China is the largest sovereign investor by a wide margin, 
holding 29% of the global pool of SWF managed assets. 
It has four large funds: the SAFE Investment Company, 
the China Investment Cooperation, Hong Kong (Special 
Administrative Region of China), the Monetary Authority 
Investment Portfolio and the National Social Security Fund, 
all created between 1993 and 2007.
 ■ SWFs have become essential nancial actors. In particular, 
SWFs nanced from sources other than commodity exports 
are a key source of international liquidity. A case in point 
are United States treasury bonds, of which China and Japan 
each hold a one-fth share. 
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7. Two thirds of the world’s middle class population is expected to be in the  
Asia-Pacific region by 2030, as against 21% in Europe and North America
 Figure 10 
Major world regions: distribution of the middle class population and middle class consumer spending, 2009, 2020 and 2030 a
(Percentages) 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Homi Kharas, “The emerging middle class in developing countries”, Working Paper, No. 285, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), January 2010.
a The 2020 and 2030 figures are projections. 
 ■ The dynamic growth that is forecast for the middle class in 
China and India could partly offset the stagnation expected 
in North America and Europe. It is also consistent with the 
greater emphasis the Chinese authorities wish to place on 
domestic demand (and, within this, consumption) in future 
growth, partly in response to the need to reduce imbalances 
between rural and urban areas and between the dynamic 
coastal zones and the less developed interior.
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8. China is still the most dynamic driver of growth in the world economy
 ■ With a growth rate of 9.2% in 2011, China has continued 
to be the main driver of global growth. It should be noted 
that the growth target set by the Chinese authorities for 
2011-2015 is 7% a year, which is well below the recent trend.
 ■ The most recent projections for the Chinese economy in 
2012 indicate growth of 8.2% (International Monetary Fund, 
April 2012) or 8.6% (Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific, May 2012). In the 2013-2017 period, 
Chinese growth is projected to be in the range of 8.5% to 
8.8% a year. The country should thus continue to be the 
fastest-growing of the world’s major economies.
 Figure 11 











































































Growth rate Annual average: 9.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China.
 
 Figure 12 












































China Annual world growth (right axis)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database [online] www.imf.org/
external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28, April 2011.
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9. If it achieves the high growth rate forecast for the coming years, China will 
overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy in 2017  
in purchasing power parity terms
 Figure 13 


















































A. GDP in PPP
(billions of dollars)
B. Per capita GDP in PPP
(dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database [online] www.imf.org/external/
ns/cs.aspx?id=28, April 2011.
a Values after 2011 are projections.
 ■ Recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) projections 
indicate that China’s GDP, measured at purchasing power 
parity (PPP), should exceed that of the United States 
in 2017. This outcome would represent a major turning 
point in the international debate about globalization 
trends and governance.
 ■ The three decades of economic reforms that began in 
China in 1979 represent the most intensive process of 
industrialization and urbanization humanity has ever 
seen. When these reforms began, China’s GDP was 
just 9% of the United States level and its per capita GDP 
just 2%. The IMF projects that in 2017, China’s GDP will 
be 3% greater than that of the United States and its per 
capita GDP will be a quarter of the United States level. 
14
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
10. 11. Total factor productivity has risen steadily in China over the last few years as  
a result of economic reforms and the take-up of new technologies
 Figure 14 
China and India: hourly labour productivity
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Total factor productivity Labour
Capital GDP growth 
 ■ Labour productivity in China grew rapidly in the last decade. 
The left-hand chart shows that Chinese labour productivity 
rose from 6% of the United States level in 2000 to 16% in 
2011. By way of comparison, in 1990 labour productivity was 
higher in India, the second largest developing economy in 
Asia, than in China. Since 2001, however, it has been lower. 
Thus, China has made greater progress than India in closing 
the productivity gap with the United States.
 ■ A better indicator for measuring the efficiency of the 
economy, including the contribution of capital, is total 
factor productivity (TFP), whose contribution to growth is 
illustrated in the right-hand chart. In the period from 2000 
to 2008, the Chinese economy grew by an average of 9.9% 
a year, and the contribution of TFP was 4.2 percentage 
points a year. In other words, 42% of the growth in GDP 
is explained by greater efciency in the use of capital and 
labour combined. The contribution of TFP was similar in 
the previous decade. The increase in the capital stock was 
the most important factor, contributing 52% to growth in 
the period. Lastly, the increase in the workforce accounted 
for 15% of GDP growth between 1990 and 1999 and just 5% 
between 2000 and 2008.
 ■ A number of factors may account for the rapid rise in Chinese 
productivity. First, structural change in the economy, with 
resources moving from low-productivity sectors (farming) 
to higher-productivity ones (industry). Second, there has 
been the large-scale take-up by rms of new technologies 
and production processes embodied in imported machinery 
and equipment and in foreign direct investment. Third, the 
country has invested a great deal in infrastructure, which has 
brought down transport and communication times and costs. 
Fourth, trade opening and global competition have also been 
a spur to greater efciency. Lastly, strong upward pressure 
on wages has made it necessary to increase productivity 
in order to maintain international competitiveness (see 
table 2 and gure 16). 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, 2012 and Asian 
Productivity Organization (APO), APO Productivity Database, 2011.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database, 2012 and Asian 
Productivity Organization (APO), APO Productivity Database, 2011. 
15
The People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Dialogue and cooperation for the new challenges of the global economy
11. Wages in China have been growing faster than productivity. Combined with the 
appreciation of the renminbi, this has driven up unit labour costs to the point 
where they are converging on Mexico’s
 ■ A study by the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics shows 
that renminbi wages doubled between 2002 and 2008 in 
urban factories and rose by even more in rural areas. Partial 
information for the period from 2009 to 2011 shows wages 
rising at double-digit annual rates. They increased even 
more strongly in dollar terms, as the renminbi appreciated 
against the dollar throughout the period.
 ■ This surge in wages is explained by growing demand for 
labour (especially in industry and construction) and by 
rising productivity. Meanwhile, the labour supply has been 
growing more slowly as migration ows from the countryside 
to the cities have declined and the working-age population 
has likewise expanded less quickly.
 ■ Notwithstanding the improvement in productivity, average 
unit labour costs in dollars rose by a factor of 2.4 between 
2002 and 2010 as a result of rising wages and currency 
appreciation. It is anticipated that these costs could soon 
be higher in China than Mexico.
 ■ This trend could encourage multinational enterprises, 
especially those from the United States, to site investments in 
Mexico (“near-shoring”) rather than China (“off-shoring”). 
However, a number of analysts have emphasized that wage 
costs are just one of the factors determining investment 
location, and that China is distinguished by the highly 
sophisticated and exible production chains and clusters 
it has developed, and by the quality of its infrastructure.
 Figure 16 









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
China Mexico
Source: United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, “International Comparisons of Hourly 
Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2010”, 11 December 2011; Pedro Aspe, on the basis 
of JP Morgan, “The Evolution of Mexico’s Economy”, presentation at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, 8 February 2012 [online] http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/
default/les/PAA%20Woodrow%20Wilson%20Feb%208.pdf [retrieved on 6 June 2012].
Note: The 2011 and 2012 data are estimates.
 Table 2 
China: hourly cost of labour in industry, 2002 to 2008
(Renminbi)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Urban areas 7.9 8.9 9.86 10.6 11.7 13.9 16.5
Rural areas 3.4 3.6 3.7 4.1 4.2 4.9 5.7
Total 4.7 5.2 5.5 5.9 6.4 8.1 9.5
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12. 13. China accounts for over 20% of the world population and has a constantly growing 
middle class, making it a market of huge potential for Latin America  
and the Caribbean
 ■ China currently accounts for 20% of the world population. 
Although this share will gradually decline over the coming 
decades, in absolute terms China’s population is not 
expected to start falling until 2030.
 ■ The Chinese middle class is estimated at 157 million people 
and is already larger than that of the United States. It is 
projected to total 500 million by 2020, making it by far the 
largest global market. Indeed, China has already overtaken 
the United States as the world’s largest market for mobile 
phones, automobiles and personal computers.
 ■ The rise in per capita income expected over the coming 
decades should boost both the size and the purchasing 
power of the Chinese middle class, turning it into a key 
market for food, higher-quality wearing apparel, tourism, 
pharmaceuticals, medical services, retail services and luxury 
goods, among other goods and services. Accordingly, it is 
vital for Latin America and the Caribbean to concentrate 
on diversifying its exports to the dynamic market that is 
the emerging Chinese middle class. 
 Table 3 
Selected regions and countries: population growth, 2000-2050
(Millions of people and annualized growth rates)
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
Annualized growth 
rate, 2010-2050
Latin America and the Caribbean 585.0 647.1 696.5 729.7 746.0 0.6
Central America 42.5 50.5 58.3 65.5 71.6 1.3
South America 392.3 431.2 461.1 479.9 487.6 0.5
The Caribbean 36.6 39.2 41.2 42.3 42.3 0.4
Mexico 113.4 125.9 135.4 141.5 143.9 0.6
Asia 4 164.3 4 565.5 4 867.7 5 061.0 5 142.2 0.5
China 1 341.3 1 387.8 1 393.1 1 360.9 1 295.6 -0.1
South-East Asia a 593.4 655.9 706.0 740.9 759.2 0.6
India 1 224.6 1 386.9 1 523.5 1 627.0 1 692.0 0.8
Other Asia 1 004.9 1 134.9 1 245.2 1 332.1 1 395.4 0.8
United States 310.4 337.1 361.7 383.5 403.1 0.7
European Union 499.3 509.7 514.5 514.0 510.3 0.1
World 6 895.9 7 656.5 8 321.4 8 874.0 9 306.1 0.8
Chinese share of the total 19.5 18.1 16.7 15.3 13.9 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2010 revision.
a  Includes Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam. 
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13. China’s working-age population will start to fall in 2015 even as the older adults group 
increases, thus raising the dependency ratio and creating pressure for dissaving
 Figure 17  
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 Figure 18  
China: dependency ratio, 1950 to 2100
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 ■ United Nations projections suggest that China’s working-
age population will peak at almost a billion around 2015. 
From then on this segment is expected to shrink, falling 
to 790 million people by 2050. The number of older adults, 
meanwhile, is forecast to rise from 130 million in 2015 
to 330 million in 2050.
 ■ As a result of these two developments, the dependency ratio 
(number of older adults per 100 working-age people) should 
increase from 11 in 2010 to 20 in 2025, 30 in 2035 and 50 in 
about 2050. The number of children per 100 working-age 
people, meanwhile, has been falling since 1965, partly as a 
result of the one child policy, and will bottom out in about 2045.
 ■ The consequences of population ageing could be manifold. 
First, although there are still a great many workers who 
could potentially migrate from the low-productivity rural 
farm sector to the better-paying industrial urban zones, 
this reserve will gradually dwindle. As it does, wage 
pressure is going to increase, something that is already 
happening. This situation means it will be a challenge 
to keep output high enough to meet growing demand 
if productivity gains are not enough to offset the fall in 
the active population.
 ■ Secondly, in the absence of a comprehensive system of 
pensions, and with the dependency ratio rising, older 
adults will increasingly have to draw on their savings as 
a means of subsistence. This will reduce the availability 
of these funds for nancing investment, thus impacting 
future economic growth. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2010 revision. 
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14. The “middle-income trap” in China and Latin America and the Caribbean: a prime 
topic for dialogue and cooperation
15. 
 ■ China’s twelfth ve-year plan (2011-2015) is designed to 
reorient the Chinese economic development model away 
from the current emphasis on investment and cheap 
exports towards a model that is more reliant on domestic 
consumption, more sustainable, more socially cohesive and 
more innovative. Rebalancing towards greater domestic 
consumption is necessary not only to offset the expected 
weakness in demand from industrialized countries but 
also to improve distribution indicators, which show a 
deterioration in earnings and a rise in income concentration. 
Thus, increases in the minimum wage and other measures 
to stimulate consumption in middle- and lower-class 
households, especially in the country’s interior, will be 
accompanied by greater public spending on social housing 
and social insurance in an attempt to narrow differences 
in incomes and quality of life between the urban and rural 
populations. One very ambitious goal is to universalize 
medical insurance coverage by incorporating a further 200 
million people into the scheme. To develop the interior, 
steps will be taken to turn Chongqing and Chengdu into 
hubs of Chinese economic and industrial strength and 
promote internal migration to these cities.
 ■ Another emphasis of the Plan is on making growth 
sustainable by carrying out a major productive restructuring, 
placing greater stress on technological innovation and 
product quality, improving environmental protection and 
reducing energy intensity and carbon emissions per unit 
of output. China’s rapid industrialization has indeed been 
based on polluting energies and low energy efficiency. 
This is changing, albeit slowly.
 ■  Reducing energy consumption per unit of output and 
investing more in unconventional renewable energies are 
vital parameters of the current ve-year plan. The potential 
for China to carry on growing at high rates in the coming 
decades and overcome the middle-income trap depends 
not only on an improved income distribution but also on 
substantial alterations to its pattern of energy use. It is no 
longer possible to carry on achieving dramatic increases 
in industrial output with high and inefcient consumption 
of water, energy and natural resources and methods that 
severely damage the environment. This is why sustainable 
energy, domestic consumption and income redistribution 
have now become vital to Chinese growth. The 2010-2011 
gures are not particularly encouraging on these indicators, 
so the likelihood is of a redoubled effort to comply effectively 
with the commitments of the ve-year plan.
 ■  China is already the leading producer of renewable energies 
and will soon be the largest exporter of technologies 
and services associated with these. If it can move ahead 
with a sustainable and more socially inclusive growth 
model, it will be setting the pace for the rest of the world. 
Thus, in examining the challenges for China’s economic 
growth, we are also debating the limitations of our own 
growth models, since environmental damage, income 
concentration and social exclusion are ills that continue 
to afflict our societies.
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15. In 2011, China retained its position as the world’s largest exporter of goods  
and fourth largest exporter of services 
 Figure 19  
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 Figure 20  























































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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17. 16. China is at the heart of what is known as “Factory Asia”, assembling parts and 
components imported from other economies in the region and exporting  
finished products
 ■ Asian production chains have developed rapidly over the last 
two decades. Production processes are highly fragmented 
and each country specializes in the phase of production for 
which it has a comparative advantage. The importance of 
regional chains is illustrated by this chart, which shows the 
high percentage accounted for by intermediate goods (parts 
and components) in the intraregional exports and imports 
of a number of the region’s main economies.
 ■ The network of interconnected producers in Asia has grown 
quickly over time, even as its conguration has shifted. In 
1985 there were just four participants, with Japan at the centre 
and Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia around it. Around 
1990, Japan extended its supply chain to other countries such 
as the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Taiwan Province of 
China. In the early 2000s, China became the second giant 
in the Asian production chain. This was contributed to by 
its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 and 
its strong production links with the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan Province of China.
 ■ From 2005, China would be at the centre of the Asian 
production chain, pushing Japan into second place. China 
is now the main regional market for intermediate goods, 
which are used to produce the nished goods exported 
to the markets of the United States and European Union. 
According to a 2010 study, the average import content of 
Chinese exports in 2008 was 37%, and it was as high as 56% in 
the case of products originating in export processing zones.1
1 Christophe Degain and Andreas Maurer, “Globalization and trade 
flows: what you see is not what you get!”, WTO Working Papers, 
No. ERSD-2010-12, 2012.
 Figure 21 
Selected Asian economies: intraregional trade in parts and 
components as a proportion of total intraregional trade,  
1995 and 2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of World Trade Organization (WTO)/Institute of Developing Economies of the Japan External 
Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO), Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: from 
Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks, Geneva, June 2011, p. 87.
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17. Although its growth slowed sharply in 2011, Chinese external trade continued to be 
more dynamic than world trade as a whole. China’s trade with emerging countries  
is growing by more than trade with industrialized countries 
 ■ China led the 2010 recovery in world trade. In that year, 
its exports and imports (measured by volume) grew 
by 28% and 22%, respectively. In 2011, in a context of 
instability and low growth in the United States and 
European Union, China’s external trade growth slowed 
sharply, with exports and imports rising by 9% and 10%, 
respectively, although these figures were still higher than 
overall growth in world trade (6%).
 ■ Although the United States, the European Union and 
Japan are China’s main trading partners, trade flows 
with emerging countries and regions have proved more 
dynamic in recent years. This highlights the growing 
importance of South-South trade to the world economy.
 Figure 22 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Trade Organization (WTO), “World Trade 2010, Prospects for 2011”, Press/628, 7 April 
2011 and “World Trade 2011, Prospects for 2012”, Press/658, 12 April 2012.
a Excludes Mexico, which the World Trade Organization (WTO) treats as part of North America. 
 Figure 23 
China: trade with selected countries and groupings, by value, 
2009-2010 and 2010-2011
(Percentage growth rates)










Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review. Report by the Secretariat. China, 2012.
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18. China’s current account surplus declined sharply in 2011 and is expected to fall 
further in 2012. This could help to correct some of the main imbalances in  
the global economy
 Figure 24  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database [online] www.imf.org/
external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28, April 2012.
a The figures for China are estimates.
b The figures for all regions and countries are estimates.
c Comprises Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China), Taiwan Province of China, 
the Republic of Korea and Singapore.
d Comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Viet Nam.
 ■ China has had the world’s largest current account surpluses 
in absolute terms over recent years. In the interests of a less 
fragile recovery in the global economy, China and other 
countries such as Germany and Japan need to reduce their 
large surpluses. In other words, the dynamic of domestic 
spending needs to be strengthened in these economies so that 
the contribution of net exports to output growth is reduced. 
If higher spending on imports is reected, for example, in 
higher exports from the United States, the economy with 
the largest trade and current account decits, the recovery 
in the world economy will be more stable and balanced. 
China’s twelfth ve-year plan is oriented accordingly, its 
aims being to raise domestic consumption as a proportion 
of income, stimulate imports and allow the currency to 
gradually appreciate. 
 ■ In 2011, China saw a large reduction in its current account 
surplus, which came in at US$ 201 billion, as compared 
to the US$ 372 billion projected by the IMF in April that 
year, while an even smaller surplus of US$ 182 billion is 
projected for 2012. This outcome has been inuenced by a 
number of factors: the gradual appreciation of the renminbi 
in real terms since 2005, the deterioration in China’s terms 
of trade because of rising prices for the raw materials it 
imports, the lack of dynamism in the markets of the United 
States and European Union, which is negatively affecting 
Chinese exports, and the rise in domestic investment as a 
percentage of GDP in China between 2007 and 2010.
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19. The most recent Chinese foreign trade data exceeded market expectations and 
suggest that the incipient slowdown since late 2011 could be coming to an end  
 ■  The strong upward trend of Chinese exports and imports 
was cut short in early 2009 because of the global nancial 
crisis. However, exports began to recover in March 2009 and 
imports in February that same year. Since then, both exports 
and imports have followed a generally upward trend.
 ■ There has been a gradual slowdown in China’s external 
trade since the last four months of 2011, in an international 
context marked by low growth and high levels of 
uncertainty in the United States and, particularly, the 
European Union. However, China’s foreign trade figures 
for May 2012 show a substantial rebound in both exports 
and imports, which grew by 15% and 13%, respectively, 
over the same month in 2011. These figures compare 
favourably with earlier market projections, which put 
year-on-year export growth in May at about 7% and 
import growth at about 5%. 
 Figure 25  
China: exports, imports and trade balance with the world,  
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 Figure 26  
China: year-on-year change in total exports and imports, by value, 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ofcial gures from the Ministry of Commerce of China.  
24
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
21. 20. In the last two decades, China has greatly increased its share of global consumption 
of a number of commodities
 ■ Between 1990 and 2011, China became one of the main 
global consumers of a number of commodities, including 
both agricultural products and minerals and fuels. In the 
cases of zinc, aluminium and copper, for example, China’s 
share of global consumption was less than 10% in 1990 but 
is now over 40%. In the cases of coal and pork, for which 
China already represented a substantial share of world 
consumption in 1990, this has also expanded over the past 
two decades to over 40%.
 ■ In the specic case of foods, the dynamism of Chinese 
consumption offers great export opportunities for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In 2011, China was the world’s 
largest consumer of wheat, soybeans, rice and meat, and the 
second largest consumer of maize.
 ■ Although China’s agricultural productivity has risen 
continuously over recent years and the country is the 
world’s largest producer of rice, cotton, wheat and potatoes, 
its agricultural sector is still in decit overall. In 2010, its 
agricultural exports were US$ 36 billion while its imports were 
US$ 67 billion. China offers great potential as an importer 
even for those products of which it is a major producer, as 
it is not self-sufcient in them.
 Figure 27  
China: share of global consumption of selected products,  
1990 and 2011 or latest year available
(Percentages of total)










Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), World 
Bureau of Metal Statistics, World Steel Association and Energy Department of the United States.
 Table 4  
China: share of global production and imports of selected 
agricultural products
(Percentages of total)
Product Percentage of global output Percentage of global imports
1990 2000 2011 1990 2000 2010
Wheat 16.7 17.1 17.7 13.2 2.0 1.4
Maize 20.1 17.9 19.7 7.5 6.0 4.2
Soybeans 10.2 9.6 5.7 7.7 26.2 44.5
Rice 37.0 31.7 30.6 4.4 3.0 3.4
Pork 34.4 45.4 44.0 3.3 6.6 5.2
Dairy 
products 1.3 2.1 5.9 2.2 2.8 2.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT). 
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21. China’s currency, the renminbi, is internationalizing and being used for a growing 
percentage of its trade, particularly imports
 ■ In July 2009, China introduced a pilot scheme to promote 
the use of the renminbi (RMB) for international trade 
payments. The scheme initially operated between ve 
cities and the Special Administrative Regions of Hong 
Kong and Macao and the countries of ASEAN. In 2010, the 
system was extended to 20 cities and provinces for trade 
with all countries of the world, covering 90% of exports. In 
August 2011, the scheme was extended throughout the 
country. In June 2012, an agreement came into force between 
China and Japan allowing rms in the two countries to carry 
out currency transactions directly in renminbi and yen.
 ■ As a result of these measures, the proportion of trade 
payments in renminbi grew rapidly. In fact, between 
the rst quarter of 2010 and the rst quarter of 2012, this 
proportion rose from less than 1% to 8%. Up to mid-2011, 
with the currency expected to appreciate, use of the system 
was largely conned to import payments. More recently, 
these expectations have moderated and use of the system 
by exporters has increased, even as it has been extended 
around the country.
 ■ A private-sector bank (HSBC) anticipates that a third 
of China’s trade may be conducted in local currency 
in 2016. Another indication of increased use of the renminbi 
is that 4% of all letters of credit issued around the world 
are in that currency, placing it third after the dollar (84%) 
and the euro (7%), according to the SWIFT international 
payments system.
 ■ There are a number of advantages to renminbi use in trade 
transactions. First, it does away with the risk of exchange-
rate uctuations for exporters and importers, which should 
reduce the use of hedging instruments and lower the cost of 
the products or services traded. This aspect is particularly 
important for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Second, payments involving all countries other than the 
United States could become quicker and cheaper, as only 
one change of currency will be required instead of two.
 Figure 28  
China: export and import payments in renminbi
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
People’s Bank of China, China Monetary Policy Report, Quarter One, 2012.
26
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
22. Since the middle of the last decade, Latin America and the Caribbean has been 
China’s most dynamic trading partner
 Figure 29 








































































































Rest of world European Union
United States Asia-Pacific a
Latin America and the Caribbean
 ■  In the 2005-2011 period, growth rates for exports from 
China to Latin America and the Caribbean and for its 
imports from the region were considerably higher than 
those for its exports and imports overall. The share of 
Latin America and the Caribbean has thus grown so that 
by 2011 it accounted for 6% of China’s exports and 7% 
of its imports. In other words, the trading relationship 
is becoming more and more substantial, although trade 
levels are still relatively low.
 ■ China’s great importance in world trade and the still low 
level of trade with it by the region are both challenges and 
opportunities for the region’s economies.
 Table 5  




1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2011
Latin America and the Caribbean 32.2 17.8 26.8 31.6
Asia-Pacic a 26.5 9.3 20.3 15.3
United States 36.7 16.1 25.6 12.2
European Union 26.3 15.0 28.8 16.1
Rest of world 8.6 7.1 26.6 18.0
World 19.1 10.9 25.0 20.0
Imports
Latin America and the Caribbean 14.5 12.7 37.6 28.2
Asia-Pacic a 32.4 12.2 23.9 15.4
United States 19.7 6.8 16.8 16.7
European Union 18.2 7.6 18.8 19.1
Rest of world 11.2 13.4 26.8 18.1
World 19.9 11.3 24.0 21.4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
a Includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN).
23. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
a Includes Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
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By the same token, in a decade China has become a key trading partner for  
Latin America and the Caribbean
 ■  China has come to account for a large share of the region’s 
trade ows, even as the United States and European Union 
have lost ground in relative terms. Between 2006 and 2011, the 
rate of growth in the region’s exports to China was more than 
triple its overall export growth rate, while the region’s imports 
23. 
from China grew twice as fast as total imports. Thus, in 2011 
China was the destination for 9% of the region’s total exports 
and the source of 14% of its imports. It has thus overtaken 
the European Union by a narrow margin as the second most 
important market of origin for the region’s imports. 
 Table 6  
Latin America and the Caribbean: trade with selected partners, 2006-2011
(Billions of dollars and growth rates)








World 670.7 758.1 879.0 679.2 865.1 1 061.9 9.6
United States 335.4 350.2 380.7 281.8 354.4 420.1 4.6
European Union 93.0 110.3 128.4 92.2 110.4 138.2 8.2
Asia 65.4 87.0 106.9 103.0 144.1 183.4 22.9
 China 22.2 34.8 42.8 47.6 71.8 94.0 33.5
 Other Asian economies 43.2 52.2 64.1 55.4 72.3 89.4 15.6
Latin America
and the Caribbean a 115.4 138.2 172.4 128.0 163.4 196.0 11.2






World 583.3 697.9 852.7 638.5 837.0 1 011.2 11.6
United States 203.3 227.4 264.6 200.2 255.4 304.0 8.4
European Union 82.3 100.1 122.7 94.2 117.1 137.5 10.8
Asia 128.7 161.3 199.3 157.8 224.3 270.3 16.0
 China 49.1 67.4 89.2 75.5 111.6 139.7 23.3
 Other Asian economies 79.6 93.9 110.1 82.4 112.6 130.6 10.4
Latin America
and the Caribbean a 119.6 143.0 180.3 132.1 164.7 205.1 11.4
Rest of world 49.4 66.2 85.8 54.2 75.6 94.4 13.8
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ofcial national statistics.
a The sum of intraregional exports reported by the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean does not match 
the sum of intraregional imports. The difference in 2011 was 4.5% (US$ 205 billion of intraregional imports versus 
US$ 196 billion of intraregional exports). 
 Table 7  
Latin America and the Caribbean: selected partners’ 








United States 59.7 39.6
European Union 11.6 13.0
 China 1.1 8.9
 Other Asian economies 4.2 8.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 16.0 18.5






United States 50.4 30.1
European Union 14.2 13.6
 China 1.8 13.8
 Other Asian economies 8.8 12.9
Latin America and the Caribbean 15.3 20.3
Rest of world 9.5 9.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), on the basis of ofcial national statistics.
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25. 24. China has already caught up with the European Union as a source of Latin American 
imports and could also overtake it as an export destination by about the middle  
of this decade
 Figure 30 

















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE) and national sources.
a The 16 countries are: Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay. Estimates and projections based on GDP growth rates from 2000 to 2009 in Asia and the Pacific, China, the European Union, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, the United States and the rest of the world. The rate of trade growth is expected to converge on countries’ economic growth rates in the long run. 
 ■ Projections up to 2020 suggest that China will continue 
to strengthen very substantially its relative position as a 
trading partner for Latin America.
 ■ If the current rate of growth in demand for the region’s 
products from the United States, the European Union 
and the rest of the world is maintained, and if Chinese 
demand grows just half as quickly as in the last decade, 
the country will overtake the European Union in 2016 as 
the region’s second largest export market.
 ■ China caught up with the European Union as the second 
largest market of origin for Latin American imports in 
2010, and is expected to overtake it in 2012.
 ■ How far these projections actually materialize could be 
inuenced by a number of factors. These include the 
economic performance of the United States, the European 
Union and China over the rest of the present decade 
and, to a lesser degree, the implementation of new trade 
agreements between those economies and countries or 
country groupings in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
29
The People’s Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean: Dialogue and cooperation for the new challenges of the global economy
25. As a region, Latin America and the Caribbean has a trade deficit with China  
because of the rising deficits of Mexico and Central America 
 Figure 31 
Exports, imports and trade balance with China
(Millions of dollars)
 ■ Latin America and the Caribbean has recorded a rising 
trade decit with China in the last decade. Patterns differ 
between the different subregions, however. In fact, the 
region’s trade decit with China is basically accounted 
for by the rising negative balance that Mexico and Central 
America have been running with the country. By contrast, 
the trade balance of South America as a whole has been in 
rough equilibrium over the past 10 years.
 ■ Latin America and the Caribbean has had a rising trade 
surplus with China in raw materials and natural resource-
based manufactures, generated specically in South America. 
Conversely, the region as a whole and all its subregions 
exhibit a growing decit with China for trade in all other 
manufactures. This asymmetry is a source of concern in 
the region and will need to be addressed when national 
and subregional trade strategies come to be decided.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
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27. 26. Most of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have trade deficits  
with China
 Figure 32   
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). 
 ■ As can be seen in the chart, just four countries in the region, 
all of them South American, run trade surpluses with China: 
Brazil, Chile, the Bolivarian Republic of the Venezuela and 
Peru. In all cases, these surpluses are due to sales of a handful 
of commodities (see table 10).
 ■ At the other extreme is Mexico’s trade decit with China, 
by far the largest run with the latter by any country in the 
region. This reects the fact that whereas less than 2% of 
Mexican exports went to China in 2011, 15% of its imports 
came from the country that year.
 ■ Mexico’s trade decit with China is equivalent to the whole 
decit of Latin America and the Caribbean. In other words, 
if Mexico is excluded, then the region’s trade with China is 
practically in balance.
 ■ By subregion, the trade balance with China in 2011 was:
- South America: US$ 3.697 billion
- Central America (including Panama): US$ 8.733 billion
- The Caribbean: US$ 3.686 billion.
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27. In a decade, China has moved strongly up the rankings as a trading partner  
for a large number of Latin American countries 
 ■ China has gone from being generally a very minor trading 
partner for the Latin American countries at the start of 
the last decade to being a hugely important one now. 
This is a very major structural change in the region’s 
external trade matrix, given the peculiarities of its trade 
with China.
 ■ As an export destination, China rose up the rankings 
between 2000 and 2011 for all the countries analysed 
in table 8 except Panama and Paraguay. Thus, in 2011 
China was the top destination for the exports of Brazil, 
Chile and Peru, the second for Argentina, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Cuba and Uruguay, and the third 
for Mexico. Generally speaking, China still occupies a 
secondary position as a destination for the exports of 
Central America and Panama.
 ■ China has made even more progress as a source of imports, 
having moved up the rankings for all 17 countries analysed. 
Thus, in 2011 it was among the top three suppliers for 
all the countries except El Salvador and Honduras, for 
which it ranked fourth and fifth, respectively.
 ■ The region does not yet seem to have embarked upon any 
strategic thinking commensurate with the scale of the 
economic and other repercussions that could arise from 
this dramatic shift in its external trade matrix. 
 Table 8 
Countries of Latin America: China’s rank as a trading partner, 2000 and 2011 a
Exports Imports
2000 2011 2000 2011
Argentina 6 2 4 2
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 18 8 7 3
Brazil 12 1 11 2
Chile 5 1 4 2
Colombia 36 4 9 2
Costa Rica b 30 13 15 2
Cuba c 6 2 3 2
Ecuador 18 16 10 2
El Salvador d 49 44 23 4
Guatemala 43 28 19 3
Honduras d 54 11 21 5
Mexico 19 3 7 2
Nicaragua 35 20 20 3
Panama 31 31 25 1
Paraguay 15 23 3 1
Peru 4 1 9 2
Uruguay e 4 2 7 3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) f 35 2 18 2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), except for the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Uruguay.
a The European Union countries were considered individually.
b China was the second largest destination market for Costa Rican exports in 2009.
c The data are from the National Bureau of Statistics (ONE) and are for 2010.
d The data are from the Central American Trade Statistics System (SEC) of the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA).
e The data are from Uruguay XXI.
f The export data are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) database. 
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28. Some countries in the region still have relatively weak trade relations with China, 
however, especially as an export market
 Figure 33  
Latin America and the Caribbean: trade shares of China and other Asia-Pacific economies, 2011
(Percentages of each country’s total exports and imports) 
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 ■ The importance of China as an export market varies greatly 
between the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Since the beginning of the last decade, China has become 
a vital market for Cuba, Chile, Brazil, Peru, the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and Argentina (in descending order 
of the share of total exports going to China). China’s share 
as a destination could be considerably higher if triangular 
export trade through Hong Kong (Special Administrative 
Region of China) is included. Conversely, the Chinese market 
has hitherto been little exploited by the other countries in 
the region, particularly Mexico and the countries of Central 
America and the Caribbean.
 ■ By contrast with the export situation, China is now a major 
source of imports for the great majority of the region’s 
countries, although its share also varies greatly from one 
country to another. 
29. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of ofcial information from the countries and International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade 
Statistics (DOTS) database. 
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29. The region’s basket of exports to China consists mainly of unprocessed  
and processed commodities
 Figure 34 
Latin America and the Caribbean: structure of exports to main 
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 ■ When the composition of Latin American and Caribbean 
exports to their main destinations is analysed by technology 
intensity, it is in exports to China that commodities have the 
largest share, averaging two thirds of the total exported to 
the country. They are followed by natural resource-based 
manufactures, such as processed mineral products and, to 
a lesser extent, agricultural products. Other (low-, medium- 
and high-technology) manufactures account between them 
for just 7% of the amount exported by the region to China.
 ■ Strong demand from China (and to a lesser extent other 
Asian economies) has been a critical factor in the renewed 
primacy of raw materials in the region’s export structure, 
a development described by ECLAC in 2009.1
1 See Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy 
2009-2010. A crisis generated in the centre and a recovery driven by the 
emerging economies (LC/G.2467-P), Santiago, Chile, September 2011. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.11.II.G, chapter II.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE) and ECLAC, External Trade Data 
Bank for Latin America and the Caribbean (BADECEL).
Note: Does not include Cuba, Granada, Haiti, Saint Kitts and Nevis or Saint Lucia. 
The categories are PP: primary products, NRBM: natural resource-based manufactures, 
LTM: low-technology manufactures, MTM: medium-technology manufactures, and HTM: high-
technology manufactures. Other Asia includes Japan, the Republic of Korea and the members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
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30. The region’s basket of exports to China is also limited in terms of the number  
of products exported 
 Table 9 
Latin America and the Caribbean: product exports to main destination markets, 2010
(Number of products at the six-digit level of the 2002 Harmonized System)
Latin America and  
the Caribbean
China Other Asia a United States European Union
Argentina 3 705  478  934 1 558 1 872
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  700  83  108  328  366
Brazil 3 905 1 080 1 706 2 565 2 839
Chile 3 015  369  529 1 338 1 274
Colombia 3 160  190  374 1 740 1 296
Costa Rica 2 722  212  397 1 716  969
Dominican Republic 1 156  63  93 1 086  440
Ecuador 1 887  95  166  971  852
El Salvador 2 461  46  90 1 038  292
Guatemala 3 278  142  358 1 402  698
Honduras b 1 816  99  141  984  377
Mexico 3 831 1 221 1 750 4 068 2 740
Nicaragua 1 835  48  43  889  228
Panama 2 937  96  146 1 179  763
Paraguay  975  47  68  235  276
Peru 2 986  304  659 1 692 1 534
Uruguay b 1 488  107  151  417  807
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1 148  44  75  579  452
Caribbean countries c 2 765  188  248 2 309 1 209
Latin America and the Caribbean d 4 773 2 281 3 004 4 523 4 034
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
a Includes Japan, the Republic of Korea and the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
b Figures for 2009.
c Includes Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
d Does not include Honduras or Uruguay. 
 ■ An analysis of the number of products exported by Latin 
America and the Caribbean to different destinations shows 
that China is the market where the region’s exports are 
most concentrated.
 ■ The region exports only half as many products to China 
as to the United States, and less than half as many as are 
exported within the region itself.
 ■ If Brazil and Mexico are excluded, the average number 
of products exported to China by the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean is less than 10% of the number 
they export within the region itself.
 ■ All this reects the fact that the region’s exports to the Chinese 
market are dominated by a small number of products, mainly 
commodities (see table 10). 
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31. An analysis by country confirms that exports from Latin America and the Caribbean 
to China are confined to a very few products, most of them commodities
 Table 10 






First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Argentina 87.8 Oil-seeds and oleaginous 
fruits, 69.3




91.3 Base metal ores, 39.2 Tin, 23.4 Precious metal ores, 20.4 Wood, simply worked, 
5.0
Leather, 3.2
Brazil 86.9 Iron ore, 49.1 Oil-seeds and oleaginous 
fruits, 22.5
Crude petroleum, Paper pulp and waste, 
3.5
Sugars, molasses and 
honey, 2.4
Chile 94.0 Copper, 60.7 Copper ore, 18.3 Iron ore, 7.8 Paper pulp and waste, 
4.9
Fruit and nuts, 2.1
Colombia 98.2 Crude petroleum, 66.2 Ferro-alloys, 14.6 Base metal scrap, 8.9 Coal, not agglomerated, 
6.5
Leather, 1.9





Apparatus for electrical 
circuits, 0.8
Leather, 0.2 Preserved or prepared 
fruit, 0.2
Cuba 99.7 Nickel ore, 61.3 Sugars, molasses and 
honey, 33.4
Base metal ores, 4.5 Base metal scrap, 0.2 Nickel, 0.2
Dominican Republic
95.1
Copper ore, 35.2 Ferro-alloys, 34.9 Base metal scrap, 14.0 Other medical apparatus, 
8.7
Paper pulp and waste, 
2.1
Ecuador 90.8 Crude petroleum, 63.6 Base metal scrap, 7.9 Aquatic invertebrates, Other wood 
manufactures, 6.4
Animal feed, 6.2
El Salvador 93.4 Other electrical 
machinery and 
apparatus, 74.0
Plastic waste, 10.7 Men’s knitwear, 3.6 Other wearing apparel, 
2.9
Scrap iron, 2.2
Guatemala 78.1 Plastic waste, 27.7 Base metal scrap, 23.8 Unworked wood, 10.1 Base metal ores, 9.1 Coffee and coffee 
substitutes, 7.3
Honduras 94.6 Iron ore, 66.2 Base metal scrap, 14.4 Base metal ores, 10.9 Other electricity 
distribution equipment, 
1.6
Other wearing apparel, 
1.3
Mexico 54.5 Copper ore, 14.0 Crude petroleum, Electronic 
microassemblies, 11.7
Passenger vehicles, 10.0 Iron ore, 6.3 
Nicaragua 92.2 Unworked wood, 46.9 Plastic waste, 16.0 Fixed vegetable oils, 14.3 Wood, simply worked, 
9.9
Base metal scrap, 4.9
Panama 93.1 Unworked wood, 57.2 Base metal scrap, 21.2 Leather, 5.6 Animal feed, 4.5 Scrap iron, 4.4
Paraguay 97.2 Leather, 54.7 Base metal scrap, 26.2 Wood, simply worked, 
11.6
Plastic waste, 3.0 Cotton, 1.5
Peru 89.3 Copper ore, 31.4 Iron ore, 18.6 Base metal ores, 16.4 Animal feed, 13.5 Copper, 9.1
Uruguay 89.5 Oil-seeds and oleaginous 
fruits, 57.1
Paper pulp and waste, 
18.9




99.8 Crude petroleum, 62.2 Petroleum derivatives, 
27.5
Iron ore, 8.1 Ferro-alloys, 1.6 Base metal scrap, 0.4
Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) 90.8
Natural gas, 55.6 Petroleum derivatives, 
13.7
Ferro-alloys, 7.5 Alcohols and halogenated 
derivatives thereof, 7.0
Unworked wood, 6.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
Note: The analysis was conducted at the four-digit level of the Standard International Trade Classication (Revision 3). Product names have been adapted to t the space available. 
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32. There is also great asymmetry between the most dynamic products exported  
by China to Latin America and the Caribbean and the most dynamic products  
exported by the region to China
 Table 11 
China: most dynamic products in trade with Latin America and the Caribbean, 2005-2011
(Percentage export and import growth) 
SITC code and description 
Growth  
2005-2011
Share of total  
exports or imports






6552 Fabrics, knitted or crotcheted 43.6 1.1 Brazil (28.7)
6842 Aluminium and aluminium alloys, worked 74.3 1.7 Mexico (74.0)
7415 Air-conditioning machines 35.3 1.5 Brazil (28.3)
7522 Digital automatic data-processing machines 66.1 3.0 Mexico (39.8)
7611 Television receivers, colour 40.3 1.4 Brazil (21.1)
7643 Transmission apparatus for radio-telephony 45.1 2.6 Mexico (33.4)
7812 Motor vehicles for the transport of persons 86.0 1.0 Brazil (40.0)
7843 Motor vehicle parts and accessories 36.6 1.2 Mexico (36.0)
7932 Ships and boats 47.9 3.5 Panama (74.5)
8312 Trunks, suitcases and similar containers 31.0 1.1 Brazil (34.9)
8442 Apparel 48.2 1.1 Panama (51.3)
8513 Footwear 32.7 1.5 Panama (39.6)





0611 Sugar 38.1 1.3 Brazil (79.9)
2815 Iron ore and concentrates 40.2 24.7 Brazil (84.2)
3330 Petroleum, crude 53.5 13.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) (46.7)
6821 Copper, rened and unrened 34.0 11.7 Chile (92,4)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
Note: A product is deemed dynamic when the amount exported or imported grew by more than overall exports or imports in the 2005-2011 period and its share of the export or import total in 2011 
was over 1%.  
 ■ The most dynamic products exported by China to Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the period from 2005 
to 2011 are all manufactures with differing degrees of 
technology intensity.
 ■  By contrast, Latin America and the Caribbean had a smaller 
number of dynamic products in its exports to China in 
the same period, and all of them were natural resources 
(primary or processed). 
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33. Imports from China have been the subject of numerous anti-dumping investigations 
in the region since late 2008
 Figure 35 
Latin America and the Caribbean: anti-dumping investigations 
against China, fourth quarter of 2008 to fourth quarter of 2011












Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q4 
2008 2009 2010 2011
Peru Mexico Colombia Brazil Argentina
 ■ Since the global economic crisis broke out, imports from China 
have often been the subject of anti-dumping measures and 
other tariff and non-tariff trade barriers in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, as elsewhere in the world.
 ■ The number of dumping investigations against Chinese 
imports peaked in 2009, the year when the effects of the 
crisis were felt most strongly in the region. After a marked 
fall-off in 2010, in the context of the post-crisis recovery, the 
number of new investigations rose again in 2011, albeit to 
levels lower than the 2009 peaks.
 ■ The Chinese products that have most often been the subject 
of anti-dumping investigations are manufactures from 
the iron and steel, chemicals, textile, footwear, household 
electrical appliances and tyre sectors. These are the very 
sectors in which Chinese manufactures have been displacing 
both imports from other sources and local production in the 
region (see table 12 and gure 36).
 ■ Most of these investigations have been initiated in those 
countries of the region that have the largest manufacturing 
sectors competing with Chinese imports: Argentina (49% 
of the total), Brazil (28%) and Mexico (11%).
 ■ In these circumstances, it is worth considering the advisability 
of Chinese and Latin American producers taking a more 
coordinated medium-term approach, concentrating on 
complementarities and opportunities for cooperation. 
Otherwise, trade disagreements are likely to persist and 
be reected in further anti-dumping measures or other 
non-tariff barriers.
Source: Chad P. Bown, “Global Anti-dumping Database” [online] www.brandeis.edu/~cbown/
global_ad/ (retrieved on 5 June 2012). 
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34. The increasing penetration of Chinese manufactures is putting pressure on the 
industrial sectors of the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
 Table 12 







Agriculture, forestry, hunting and 
sheries
9.2 14.6 14.5
Petroleum and mining  -0.8 7.7 7.7
Food, beverages and tobacco 33.4 9.8 10.6
Textiles, wearing apparel and footwear 20.7 -4.2 9.4
Wood, cellulose and paper 29.1 6.6 7.3
Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 24.4 15.2 15.5
Rubber and plastic 27.5 7.5 9.0
Non-metallic minerals 26.0 7.7 10.5
Metals and derivatives 38.2 10.3 13.9
Machinery and equipment 27.9 7.5 10.7
Automobiles and parts and components 25.4 12.6 13.1
Other manufactures 22.2 9.9 13.0
Manufactures 27.4 10.2 12.0
Total 27.2 10.2 11.9
 ■ Observation of the rate of growth of imports from China 
by a group of six countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico) between 2005 and 
2010 reveals that these imports grew by more than those 
from the rest of the world in 10 of the 12 sectors analysed.
 ■ It is possible to identify at least six industrial sectors in 
which Chinese imports appear to be displacing local 
producers: machinery and equipment; textiles, wearing 
apparel and footwear; rubber and plastic; metals and 
derivatives; automobiles and parts; and other manufactures. 
This is reected in the rising share of Chinese imports 
in the apparent consumption of these sectors between 
2005 and 2010.
 ■ The competitive pressure exerted by Chinese manufactures 
on the region’s industrial sectors has become even stronger 
as a result of the real exchange-rate appreciation experienced 
by a number of countries in the region since 2010, which 
has led to calls for greater protection.
 Figure 36   
Latin America (six countries): share of Chinese imports in 
apparent consumption, 2005 and 2010 a
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Source: José Durán and Andrea Pellandra, “Cambios en la estructura económica e industrial 
mundial en la primera década del siglo XXI: El efecto de la emergencia de China sobre 
producción y comercio en América Latina y el Caribe”, unpublished, May 2012.
a  The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico.
Source: José Durán and Andrea Pellandra, “Cambios en la estructura económica e industrial 
mundial en la primera década del siglo XXI: El efecto de la emergencia de China sobre 
producción y comercio en América Latina y el Caribe”, unpublished, May 2012.
a  The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico. 
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35. China has become a platform through which its Asian neighbours export to the 
developed countries. Latin America and the Caribbean should seek to form part  
of these value chains
 Table 13 









Latin America and  
the Caribbean
- 34 a -78 271 -10 537 33 096 32 117 23 463
South America -31 288 -74 067 -16 838 20 396 21 919 17 237
Mexico and Central America 28 229 -3 337 6 073 11 403 8 208 5 853
Caribbean 3 025 -868 228 1 297 1 991 372
Asia-Pacic -202 211 -97 859 -41 364 85 151 -54 283 -92 476
ASEAN -25 165 -34 220 -14 189 35 428 24 906 -37 590
Australia and New Zealand -50 555 -74 548 -4 310 13 396 7 306 9 075
Republic of Korea -80 395 3 838 -16 683 8 199 -27 668 -47 088
Japan -46 096 7 072 -6 181 28 128 -58 828 -16 872
United States 200 643 -21 064 -3 268 110 790 22 741 94 622
European Union 144 529 1 278 -8 748 105 042 -37 409 83 850
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
a China’s statistics for 2011 show a trade balance with Latin America and the Caribbean that is practically in equilibrium. The statistics of the region’s countries, on the other hand, show a trade 
deficit with China of about US$ 46 billion that year. 
 ■ China has a trade deficit with ASEAN, the Republic of 
Korea and Japan, since they are the main suppliers of 
capital goods and intermediate inputs for its manufacturing 
industry. Chinese manufactures are then exported on to 
other trading partners, chiefly the United States and the 
European Union, with which the country has the most 
favourable trade balances, especially in manufactures 
with low and high technology content. China is thus 
becoming a platform through which many neighbouring 
countries in Asia export to the United States and Europe.
 ■ Although Latin America and the Caribbean is a major 
supplier of commodities and natural resource-based 
manufactures to China, the region is competing with 
the ASEAN countries, the United States, Australia and 
New Zealand in commodities, and also with Japan 
and the Republic of Korea in natural resource-based 
manufactures.
 ■ The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean should 
be working towards integrating into the value and supply 
chains making up “Factory Asia”, organized around 
China. Such integration would require greater efforts 
by Latin American businesses to strengthen biregional 
links between trade and investment via different forms 
of business partnership. 
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36. In the past five years, China has become increasingly involved in WTO dispute 
settlement cases 
 Table 14 




Subject of the dispute  Agreements involved a Stage reached
United States 2002 Denitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products Safeguards, GATT                            Appellate Body
United States 2007 Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations 
on Coated Free Sheet Paper from China
SCM, Protocol of Accession, Anti-
Dumping Agreement, GATT
Consultation phase
United States 2008 Denitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain 
Products from China
SMC, Protocolo de Adhesión, 
Acuerdo Antidumping, GATT 
Appellate Body
United States 2009 Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China SPS, Agriculture, GATT Panel
European Union 2009 Denitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners 
from China
Protocol of Accession, Anti-
Dumping Agreement, GATT 
Appellate Body
United States 2009 Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light 
Truck Tyres from China
Protocol of Accession, GATT  Appellate Body
European Union 2010 Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear from China Protocol of Accession, Anti-
Dumping Agreement, GATT
Panel
United States 2011 Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades  
from China
Anti-dumping, GATT Consultation phase
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO). Dispute settlement: the disputes [online] http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/nd_dispu_cases_e.htm and Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Integrated Database of Trade Disputes for Latin America and the Caribbean (IDATD) [online] http://badicc.cepal.org.
a Abbreviations: GATT: 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, SPS: Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, SCM: Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures.
 ■ A decade on from its entry into the WTO, China has 
participated in 119 disputes: eight as complainant, 26 as 
respondent and 85 as a third party.
 ■ In the early years, China’s participation in the dispute 
settlement mechanism tended to be passive. Thus, between 
2002 and 2005 it was a complainant in just one dispute 
and was likewise a respondent in one.
 ■ China has participated far more actively in dispute settlement 
proceedings since 2006, as both complainant and respondent. 
Specically, it has been a complainant in seven disputes, all 
of them involving either the United States or the European 
Union. Most disputes concern the use of trade defence 
instruments, particularly anti-dumping measures, against 
Chinese exports.
 Figure 37   









2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Complainant Respondent
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO). Dispute settlement: the disputes [online] http://wto.
org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/nd_dispu_cases_e.htm [retrieved on 31 May 2012]. 
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37. Most cases against China have been brought by the United States and  
the European Union 
 Table 15 




Subject of the dispute                                                                                       Agreements involved a Stage reached
United States 2004 Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits                                                                           Services, GATT Consultation 
European Union, United 
States, Canada
2006 Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts                                                       SCM, TRIMs, PA, GATT Appellate Body
United States 2007 Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and 
Other Payments
SCM, TRIMs, PA, GATT Consultation
Mexico 2007 Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and 
Other Payments
SCM, TRIMs, PA, GATT Consultation 
(agreement reached)
United States 2007 Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights
TRIPS Panel
United States 2007 Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products
PA, GATS, GATT Appellate Body
European Union, United 
States, Canada
2008 Measures Affecting Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial 
Information Suppliers
TRIPS, GATS, PA Consultation
United States 2008 Grants, Loans and Other Incentives                                                                    Agriculture, SCM, PA, GATT Consultation
Mexico 2008 Grants, Loans and Other Incentives                                                                    Agriculture, SCM, PA, GATT Consultation
Guatemala 2009 Grants, Loans and Other Incentives                                                                    Agriculture, SCM, PA, GATT Consultation
United States 2009 Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials                                                PA, GATT Appellate Body
European Union 2009 Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials                                                PA, GATT Appellate Body
Mexico 2009 Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials                                                PA, GATT Appellate Body
European Union 2010 Provisional Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain Iron and Steel Fasteners from the 
European Union
Anti-dumping, GATT Consultation
United States 2010 Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services GATS Consultation
United States 2010 Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-Rolled Electrical 
Steel from the United States 
SCM, Anti-dumping, GATT Consultation
United States 2010 Measures Concerning Wind Power Equipment SCM, PA, GATT Consultation
European Union 2011 Denitive Anti-Dumping Duties on X-Ray Security Inspection Equipment from the 
European Union
Anti-dumping, GATT Consultation
United States 2011 Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Measures on Broiler Products from the 
United States
SCM, Anti-dumping, GATT Panel
United States, European 
Union, Japan 
2012 Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum PA, GATT Consultation
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO) [online] http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/nd_dispu_cases_e.htm and Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
Integrated Database of Trade Disputes for Latin America and the Caribbean (BADICC) [online] http://badicc.cepal.org.
a Abbreviations: GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, PA: Protocol of Accession of China to the WTO, Safeguards: Agreement on Safeguards, SCM: Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, SPS: Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, TRIMs: Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. 
 ■ Since entering the WTO, China has been a respondent in 
26 disputes (25 of them since 2006). Most of these have 
been initiated by the United States or the European Union. 
The only Latin American countries to have brought cases 
against China are Guatemala and Mexico. The disputes 
involving China as respondent have concerned a wide range 
of issues that include, among other things, the protection 
of intellectual property rights, restrictions on raw material 
exports, conditions placed on the provision of certain services, 
and measures to support the renewable energy sector.
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38. Some of China’s recent WTO disputes may have major implications for  
the development of and trade in new technologies, including  
environmental technologies
 Table 16 
Uses of rare earths in high-technology products, green 
technologies and defence systems
High-technology
products
























Source: United States Congressional Research Service, Rare Earth Elements: The Global 
Supply Chain, 8 June 2012.
 ■ In March 2012, the United States, the European Union and 
Japan initiated a dispute at the WTO over measures by China 
restricting exports of rare earths. This is the term commonly 
used for a group of 17 chemical elements: scandium, yttrium, 
lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, 
samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, 
holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium and lutetium.
 ■ With sustainable development now a core concern on the 
global agenda, rare earths, and their application in new 
technologies, have become increasingly important in world 
trade. While these minerals have been widely used in high-
technology products and defence systems for decades, 
they have recently been applied as well to the creation and 
development of clean energy technologies.
 ■ China has 50% of the world’s reserves of rare earths. Since 
the 1980s it has been the dominant producer and supplier 
of these, with Japan and the United States as its main 
export markets.
 ■ China has expressed concern about the damage caused to 
the environment by the large-scale extraction of rare earths, 
and about their possible depletion. To remedy this, it has 
implemented measures that have led to the application of 
export quotas, reducing the amount of these earths available 
to other countries.
 ■ The dispute is still at the consultation phase. The outcome 
will have major implications for the global supply of these 
earths, which are essential to the development of new 
industries and technologies.
Other disputes involving China at the WTO  
with environmental implications
The dispute over rare earths is not the rst to involve the Chinese 
system for exporting natural resources. In 2009, the United States, 
the European Union and Mexico initiated disputes with China over 
measures limiting the export of certain raw materials used in technology 
products, including bauxite, coke, uorspar, magnesium, manganese, 
silicon carbide, silicon metal, yellow phosphorus and zinc. China 
produces these raw materials, and in some cases is the only source. 
China stated that the measures concerned had been implemented 
in order to conserve these natural resources and protect the health 
of its citizens.
A Panel found that China’s export duties were inconsistent with its 
commitments as a WTO member. The WTO Appellate Body conrmed 
these ndings. The deadline agreed for China to bring its regulations 
into line with WTO provisions expires in December 2012
Lastly, in December 2010 the United States asked China to hold 
a consultation under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism with 
regard to certain support measures for rms manufacturing wind 
energy equipment. According to the United States, these measures 
could be incompatible with WTO subsidies provisions. The parties 
are still in consultation.
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39. Despite opening its market considerably since joining the WTO, China still maintains 
high tariffs in sectors of interest to Latin American and Caribbean exporters
 Figure 38 



















































































































































































































 ■ China maintains average applied tariffs of over 10% ad 
valorem in all agriculture and agroindustry subsectors, 
as well as on sheries products. These tariffs approach or 
even exceed 25% ad valorem for cereals and preparations 
thereof, sugar and confectionery, and beverages and 
tobacco. These levels of protection are substantial, albeit 
lower than those maintained by other Asian economies in 
the area of agriculture.
 ■ Conversely, China’s lowest levels of tariff protection are in 
the mining, forestry, chemicals and hydrocarbons sectors. 
These, along with oil-seeds and oleaginous fruits, account 
for the bulk of Latin American and Caribbean exports to 
the country.
 ■ It can be concluded from this that the tariff structure of 
China is one of the factors contributing to the low degree 
of diversication in the region’s exports to the country. 
This and other reasons have led some countries in the region 
to seek free trade agreements with China (see table 17). Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Trade Organization (WTO), World Tariff Profiles 2011. 
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40. China is actively extending its network of trade agreements, which already includes 
agreements with three countries in the region
 ■ China has 11 trade agreements in force, differing in scope 
and depth. These have been signed with economies in Asia 
and the Pacific and with three countries in Latin America. 
Those are Chile (in force since 2006), Peru (since 2010) 
and Costa Rica (since 2011). All three can be classified 
as free trade agreements (FTAs), since the proportion of 
goods on which tariffs are to be removed is over 90%. 
In addition, other issues such as trade in services and 
investment are addressed.
 ■ China is currently in the process of expanding its network 
of trade agreements, negotiating with countries or groups 
of countries in Oceania, the Middle East, Europe and Africa.
 ■ In parallel with this, China is continuing to strengthen its 
ties in Asia. To this end, it is participating in initiatives of 
vast scope, including the projects known as ASEAN+3 
and ASEAN+6. An enormous step towards putting these 
initiatives into effect would be the materialization of an FTA 
between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, a project 
that has been under consideration for a number of years.
 ■ In May 2012, three developments of importance for economic 
relations between the three largest economies in East Asia 
took place. First, the Prime Ministers of China and Japan 
and the President of the Republic of Korea announced that 
negotiations on a trilateral FTA would begin before the end 
of 2012. Second, the three countries signed an investment 
promotion, facilitation and protection agreement. Lastly, 
the rst round of negotiations was held for an FTA between 
China and the Republic of Korea.
 ■ In Latin America and the Caribbean, besides the agreements 
with Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, agreement was reached in 
May 2012 on the creation of a binational group to assess the 
feasibility of starting negotiations on an FTA between China 
and Colombia. All this reects the growing importance of 
China as a trading partner for the region.
 Table 17 
China’s trade agreements, June 2012
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
World Trade Organization (WTO), Trade Policy Review. Report by the Secretariat. China, 2012.
a Bangladesh, China, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea and Sri Lanka.
b China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the 10 ASEAN members.
c The ASEAN+3 participants plus Australia, India and New Zealand.
 Table 18 
Areas covered by China’s agreements with Chile, Peru  
and Costa Rica
Area Chile Peru Costa Rica
Tariff removal Yes Yes Yes
Customs procedures Yes Yes Yes
Rules of origin Yes Yes Yes
Trade defence Yes Yes Yes
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures Yes Yes Yes
Technical barriers to trade Yes Yes Yes
Trade in services Yes Yes Yes
Temporary entry for business persons No Yes Yes
Investment No a Yes Yes
Intellectual property Yes b Yes Yes
Government procurement No No No
Competition policy No No No
Dispute settlement Yes Yes Yes
Transparency Yes Yes Yes
Cooperation Yes Yes Yes
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of Organization of American States (OAS), Foreign Trade Information System (SICE) [online] 
www.sice.oas.org.
a Chile and China are currently negotiating an investment chapter.
b Geographical denominations only. 
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41. The cooperation chapters of the free trade agreements between China and  
Latin American countries are wide-ranging
 ■ The three FTAs signed between China and Latin American 
countries contain cooperation chapters encompassing a 
wide range of issues. They all provide for cooperation on 
economic, educational and cultural issues, SMEs, research, 
science and technology, the environment, investment and 
intellectual property protection, among other things. In 
addition to these common issues, cooperation chapters 
cover others like fisheries, tourism and traditional medicine 
(in the case of Peru) and natural disaster management 
and private dispute settlement (in the case of Costa Rica).
 ■  Cooperation between China and these countries has been 
manifested in high-level visits, the signing of cooperation 
agreements, contacts between academic institutions and the 
establishment of cultural centres, among other activities.
 ■ In June 2011, Chile and China signed nine cooperation 
agreements covering agriculture, telecommunications 
and technology and investment, among other areas. In 
the area of mining, a strategic cooperation memorandum 
was signed between the National Copper Corporation 
of Chile (Codelco) and Minmetals of China. In February 
2012, Chile’s National Industrial Property Institute 
(INAPI) and the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) 
of China signed a cooperation agreement providing for 
the promotion, protection and administration of industrial 
property rights.
 ■  China and Peru signed an Agreement on Economic and 
Technical Cooperation in May 2011, and this was followed 
in October that year by a Memorandum of Understanding 
for Cooperation in Higher Education between the Strategic 
Alliance of Peruvian Universities (AEUP) and the China 
Education Association for International Exchange (CEAIE). 
It provides for exchanges of researchers between universities 
in different areas of knowledge.
 Table 19 





Economic cooperation Yes Yes Yes
Research, science and technology Yes Yes Yes a
SMEs Yes Yes Yes
Culture Yes Yes Yes
Education Yes Yes Yes
Environment Yes Yes b Yes
Investment Yes Yes Yes c
Information technology Yes Yes Yes
Intellectual property Yes Yes Yes
Competition Yes Yes Yes
Additional areas
Mining and industry                       Yes Yes No
Agriculture No Yes Yes
Labour and social security Yes Yes No
Traditional medicine No Yes No
Fisheries No Yes No
Tourism                   No Yes No
Natural disaster management No No Yes
Private dispute settlement No No Yes
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
Organization of American States (OAS), Foreign Trade Information System (SICE) [online] www.
sice.oas.org/agreements_s.asp.
Note: Some areas are not covered by specic articles but are dealt with in the cooperation 
and other chapters.
a Promotion of Innovation, Science and Technology.
b Cooperation on Forestry and Environmental Protection.
c Not only does investment have its own chapter, but the agreement also reaffirms the commitments 
made under the October 2007 Agreement on Investment Promotion and Protection between 
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica.
 ■ In June 2012, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed 
between Costa Rica’s State-owned oil refiner Recope, China 
Development Bank (CDB) and China National Petroleum 
Corporation International (CNPCI) with a view to raising 
financing for a joint refinery. 
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42. Although Latin America and the Caribbean is an important destination  
for Chinese FDI, too much of this goes to financial centres
 ■ It is estimated that as of late 2010, about 14% of China’s 
outward FDI had gone to the economies of Latin America 
and the Caribbean, bringing the stock of Chinese FDI in 
the region to close to US$ 44 billion. However, 92% of this 
went to nancial centres in the Caribbean, specically the 
Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands.
 Table 20 
Latin America and the Caribbean: classification of Chinese FDI destinations, 2009-2010
(Millions of dollars and percentages of total revenues) 
Country/region
Stock of Chinese FDI,  
end-December 2009
Chinese FDI flows in 2010
Stock of Chinese FDI  
at end-2010
Percentages of FDI stock  
in the region, end-2010
Total worldwide outward FDI                               245 750.0 68 811.0 317 210.0 ...
Latin America and the Caribbean              30 595.5 10 538.3 43 875.6 100.0 
British Virgin Islands                                                15 060.7 6 119.8 23 242.8 53.0 
Cayman Islands                                                    13 577.1 3 496.1 17 256.3 39.3 
Brazil                                                                          360.9 487.5 923.7 2.1 
Peru                                                                            284.5 139.0 654.5 1.5 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)               272.0 94.4 416.5 0.9 
Panama                                                                         81.1 26.1 236.6 0.5 
Argentina                                                                    169.1 27.2 219.0 0.5 
Guyana                                                                       149.6 28.4 183.2 0.4 
Mexico                                                                         173.9 26.7 152.9 0.3 
Ecuador                                                                  106.6 22.1 129.6 0.3 
Chile                                                                               66.0 33.7 109.6 0.2 
Rest of region 294.1 37.3 351.2 0.8 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Ministry of Commerce of China (MOFCOM), 2010 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment, Beijing.
 ■ A growing number of large Chinese public rms operating 
in the natural resource and manufacturing sectors have 
invested in the region recently, but the size and scope of 
these companies’ activities remain limited.
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43. Chinese direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean still has a great deal  
of room to grow 
 Figure 39 













































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign Direct 
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 2010 (LC/G.2494-P), Santiago, Chile, 2011. 
United Nations publication, Sales No. E.11.II.G.4 and Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America 
and the Caribbean 2011 (LC/G.2538-P), Santiago, Chile, 2012. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.12.II.G.4.
a The chart covers 80% of total FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean.
 ■ ECLAC estimates that Chinese firms invested over US$ 15 
billion in the region in 2010. China thus became the third 
largest investor in Latin America and the Caribbean that 
year, after the United States (17%) and the Netherlands 
(13%), with a share of 9%. This marked a departure from 
the historical trend, as China had previously had only a 
small investment presence in the region.
 ■ Over 90% of Chinese investment in the region in 2010 
went into natural resource extraction, mainly in the 
hydrocarbons sector and to a lesser extent in mining. 
The largest investment was made by Sinopec, which 
acquired 40% of the Brazilian operations of Repsol-YPF 
for US$ 7.111 billion. The oil companies CNOOC and 
Sinochem also announced major acquisitions in Brazil 
and Argentina, respectively. In mining, mention should 
be made of Chinalco and Minmetals (Peru) and Wuhan 
(Brazil). Investments were made in telecommunications 
by Huawei and ZTE and in the automotive sector by 
BYD, Chery and Geely.
 ■ By countries, Chinese FDI mainly goes to Brazil, Argentina 
and Peru, which have a strong trade relationship with the 
country. China can be a significant source of investment for 
some small economies, as it has been recently in Ecuador 
and Guyana. There is very little Chinese investment in 
Mexico and Central America, with the sole exception of 
Costa Rica.
 ■ By contrast with the strong influx of Chinese investment 
in 2010, in 2011 the country once again accounted for only 
a small fraction (1%) of the FDI received by the region. 
There were some major investments, however, such as 
the acquisitions by Sinochem in Brazil and Sinopec in 
Argentina. There were also greenfield investments, such 
as the mining operations of Minmetals and Chinalco in 
Peru and the financing by China’s Exim Bank of the large 
Baha Mar tourism project in the Bahamas.
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44. Official visits to Latin America and the Caribbean by Chinese heads of State  
have grown significantly in the recent period, reflecting an ample agenda  
of mutual interests 
 ■ Ofcial visits to Latin America and the Caribbean by the 
highest Chinese authorities since the beginning of the last 
decade reect the convergence of interests on an agenda of 
mutual benet. Along with these visits, the map of contacts 
is growing and diversifying.
 ■ On the commercial front, the China Council for the Promotion 
of International Trade has held ve China-Latin America 
Business Summits, with more and more businesses from 
both sides participating. The rst was held in Santiago 
(2007) and the next in Harbin, Heilongjiang (2008), Bogotá 
(2009), Chengdu (2010) and Lima (2011). The sixth will be 
held in Hangzhou in October 2012.
 ■ In November 2010, the Chinese People’s Institute of 
Foreign Affairs hosted the rst China-Latin America and 
 Table 21 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean: visits by high-level authorities, 2001 to June 2012
Year Chinese authority  China to Latin America Latin America to China
2001 Jiang Zemin Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, Cuba
Peru, Chile, Mexico, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
2002 Jiang Zemin  Mexico (unofcial visit) a Ecuador, Uruguay
2003 Jiang Zemin Ecuador, Cuba, Guyana
2004 Hu Jintao Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Cuba Argentina, Brazil, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Suriname
2005 Hu Jintao Mexico Peru, Colombia
2006 Hu Jintao Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Plurinational
State of Bolivia
2007 Hu Jintao Costa Rica
2008 Hu Jintao Peru, Costa Rica, Cuba Peru, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela
2009 Hu Jintao Chile, Brazil, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Uruguay
2010 Hu Jintao Brazil, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile b               Argentina, Chile
2011 Vice-president  
Xi Jinping
Cuba, Uruguay, Chile Brazil
2012 Prime Minister Wen Jiabao Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile Colombia
Source: Ofcial website of the Government of China [online] http://english.gov.cn.
a President Jiang visited Mexico in 2002 only to attend the APEC meeting.
b The visits to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Chile were cancelled because of the earthquake in the region of Qinghai (China). 
the Caribbean Think Tank Forum in Beijing. ECLAC has 
been involved in all these activities.
 ■ In November 2008, the Chinese Government published its 
white paper on relations between China and Latin America. 
The document covers a variety of subjects on the bilateral 
agenda, such as economics, trade, culture, defence, tourism, 
sport and cooperation.
 ■ It is clearly China that is taking the lead in energizing 
bilateral relations. The time seems to have come when 
the region can dene a shared strategy for engaging 
with China and Asia-Pacic. In the region’s emerging 
process of internationalization, there are already forums 
for institutional dialogue with the United States and the 
European Union. Similar arrangements oriented towards 
China and Asia-Pacic have yet to be put in place. 
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Conclusions and recommendations
 ■ China has been, and will continue to be, a key actor in the 
rapidly changing economic geography of today’s world. Its 
GDP, measured in purchasing power parity, is expected to 
overtake that of the United States in 2017, making it the world’s 
largest economy. This historic development is coinciding 
with a dramatic strengthening of China’s trade links with 
emerging and developing economies. On the assumption that 
the dynamism of the world economy in the coming decades 
will depend greatly on what happens to China and the Asian 
economies in general, there is a major challenge to be met if 
the dynamic of South-South investment and trade is to alter 
the traditional pattern of developing economies’ participation 
in the international division of labour.
 ■ The high growth expected for China over the next 10 to 
15 years, even allowing for the moderation projected in 
the twelfth five-year plan, holds out the prospect of a 
prolongation of the favourable terms-of-trade cycle from 
which the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean 
have benefited since 2003, particularly those of South 
America. This would provide them with additional 
resources that would be extremely helpful, if properly 
used, in closing the innovation and competitiveness gaps 
that still affect the region.
 ■ The time has come for a qualitative leap in the 
relationship with China and the Asia-Pacific region 
generally. China is now venturing abroad with growing 
but still comparatively small investments. Trans-Latins 
(Latin American transnationals) are further along their 
international learning curves than many Chinese firms, 
especially in banking, financial and business services, 
energy, mining and agrifoods. In areas where the trans-
Latins have advantages, then, there is a need to move 
quickly to define innovative policies that enable them to 
tap the enormous resources of China’s sovereign funds, 
banks and firms. These are promising areas in which to 
nurture Sino-Latin American business partnerships, and 
in which joint initiatives could be explored in the context 
of the incipient internationalization of the renminbi.
 ■ China’s large savings surpluses could also help to finance 
infrastructure, energy, transport and logistics infrastructure 
in Latin America and the Caribbean. There should be all 
the more interest in this given the low rates of interest and 
growth projected for the industrialized economies in the 
next five years. The challenge for the region is to identify 
these projects, evaluate them and develop a portfolio of 
projects where Chinese investment would do most to 
speed up work. Infrastructure projects decided on as 
part of the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional 
Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA) and the Meso-
America Project look like natural candidates.  
 ■ If the region’s countries are able to make the needful progress 
with innovation, competitiveness, the internationalization 
of firms and an increasing presence in global or regional 
value chains, they will improve employment quality and 
pay. If all this is complemented by active policies to bring 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) into the process, 
it will be possible to make progress with growth, equity 
and international trade at the same time. If the moment 
is not seized, however, the renewed preponderance of 
commodity exports could become entrenched and a new 
form of centre-periphery relationship could arise between 
China and Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 ■ If the region as a whole is to become an important 
economic and trading partner for China, it is urgent for the 
countries to join forces and decide on a concerted agenda 
of regional priorities. This means giving preference to 
multinational approaches and placing less emphasis on 
unilateral initiatives. For this, it is necessary to organize 
technical meetings and high-level political and business 
gatherings, hopefully culminating in the near future in a 
China-Latin America and the Caribbean summit of heads 
of State, like those China holds with Europe, Asia, Africa 
and the Arab world.
 ■ A shared trade and investment working agenda for Latin 
America and the Caribbean and China could include the 
following subjects, among others:
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- The establishment of a working group to examine the 
statistics on trade between the two sides, with a view 
to dealing with the major discrepancies that currently 
exist between the Chinese gures and those of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries.
- Regular sharing of information on basic economic indi-
cators, investment and biregional trade legislation and 
trends, and market access opportunities and conditions 
(technical standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
non-tariff trade barriers, trade defence rules).
- Regular sharing of information on the two sides’ respec-
tive foreign investment regimes and on opportunities for 
Chinese investment in Latin America and the Caribbean 
and for investment by the region in China.
- The establishment of regular forums for dialogue on the 
different trade negotiation and integration initiatives 
currently under way in Latin America and the Caribbean 
and in Asia and the Pacic, including any impacts on 
the economic and trade relationship between the region 
and China.
- The establishment of a forum to detect and remove any obs-
tacles to trade and to identify opportunities for diversifying 
it. This should also be the main forum for the negotiated 
prevention or settlement of any disputes on the basis of a 
long-term outlook that seeks the mutual benet of the parties. 
 This point is very important, given the concern that 
exists about the strong competition Chinese manufac-
tures represent for the region’s industrial sectors.
 ■ Nonetheless, the main challenge before the region is 
internal. The issue is how to link the domestic innovation 
and competitiveness agenda with renewed economic ties to 
China and the Asia-Pacific region in general. For example, 
more innovation and knowledge need to be incorporated 
into exports to prevent their being excessively skewed 
towards commodities. This requires active production 
development policies to pursue advances in productivity, 
innovation, infrastructure, transport, logistics and human 
resource quality. Every one of these issues offers scope to 
construct an agenda for regional cooperation with China, 
to the benefit of both sides.
 ■ More and better regional cooperation and integration 
would be very helpful in this task. Joint regional or 
subregional initiatives on innovation, competitiveness, 
infrastructure and anti-climate change measures would 
complement the contribution of national public policies. If 
the region’s countries use these spaces actively, attractive 
opportunities will arise for trade and investment with 
China and with the whole Asia-Pacific region.
 ■ One step forward here has been the creation of the 
Latin America-Asia-Pacific Relations Observatory, an 
initiative of the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA), the CAF Development Bank of Latin America 
and ECLAC, which came into operation on 31 May 2012. 
The Observatory will furnish fuller knowledge about the 
economic relations between the two regions and will have 
a permanent mechanism to enable the region’s countries 
to obtain the information they need to adopt policies and 
strategies in this area.
 ■ In conclusion, it should be noted that the Chinese academic 
debate sometimes illustrates the “middle income trap” to 
be avoided by evoking the difficulties the Latin American 
development process has had in achieving growth, 
competitiveness and progress on equality. Nonetheless, 
the most recent data show that in the first decade of this 
century the region made substantial progress on growth 
and even on distributional equity, although considerably 
less on innovation and competitiveness. However, the scope 
for sharing public policy experience in this area could be 
very extensive and mutually enriching. Numerous regional 
experiences with targeted social spending, conditional 
transfers, countercyclical macroeconomic management, 
prudential financial supervision, fiscal reforms and 
public-private coordination could be disseminated in 
China, stimulating the debate about economic and social 
reform oriented towards sustainable development with 
greater social cohesion. These are the key parameters that 
ECLAC has been conveying to the region’s governments 
with the document Time for equality: closing gaps, opening 
trails. This, then, is another area of cooperation that 
should be pursued. 

